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This thesis examines the roles of decision makers in three phases of a special 
operation: the approval phase, the preparation phase, and the execution phase. The author 
argues that the level of decision makers’ involvement should be high in the approval 
phase, medium in the preparation phase, and low in the execution phase. Four special 
operations—Operation Thunderbolt, Operation Nimrod, Operation Eagle Claw, and the 
Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis—which were conducted by different countries’ Special 
Forces, are studied in order to test the argument. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to draw 
attention to the specific roles that decision makers should perform for a successful special 
operation. It concludes by offering these specific activities for decision makers: 
Examining Less Risky Options, Gaining International and Domestic Support, Delegating 
Authority, Establishing Clear Chain of Command, Selecting Appropriate Units, Gaining 
Time, Coordinating, and Preserving Secrecy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCING THE STUDY  
Today’s complex, rapidly changing, and uncertain security environment has 
expanded the Special Forces’ role in solving complex problems. Government leadership 
is eager to use Special Operations Forces (SOF) to respond to these complex problems. 
Numerous reasons justify using SOF to address internal and external challenges: 
economy of force, highly trained personnel, and the flexibility of SOF units. Thus, SOF’s 
increasing importance requires a deep understanding of the capabilities and limitations of 
special operations and the factors required for proper SOF application. 
Understanding the level of intervention and conducting special operations 
correctly are crucially important for those who will authorize a special operation to solve 
an ongoing crisis. Likewise, understanding the appropriate role of senior decision makers 
for SOF application will be beneficial for them to manage the process efficiently. In this 
respect, the wrong level of decision-maker involvement while conducting special 
operations may cause undesirable consequences, which might damage a nation’s prestige, 
lose high-value special operations forces’ personnel and civilian lives, and produce more 
serious problems than before.  
This research examines the roles and activities of decision makers by focusing on 
the level of the decision maker’s involvement during three phases of special operations: 
approval, preparation, and execution.  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of the research is to present a clear understanding of senior decision 
makers’ level of involvement and to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of 
senior decision makers when managing special operations that are short-duration direct 
actions. Four cases are selected for analysis based on the availability of resources 
necessary for research.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION  
What is the appropriate level of control and involvement of senior-level decision 
makers during the approval, preparation, and execution phases of a special operation? To 
answer this question, the hypotheses that resulted from examining the existing literature 
are tested across the case studies. The verified roles identified in the case studies are 
intended to guide senior decision makers when they are directing the process of 
conducting a special operation.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature that sheds light on the research question focuses on special 
operations, special operation forces, and strategy related to special operations. Significant 
academic works cover these subjects which may be subdivided into three main 
categories: theory of special operations and SOF’ roles and missions, the growing 
importance of SOF in modern warfare, and the strategic utility of SOF. However, the 
literature related to the level of involvement and the roles of senior decision makers in 
special operations is limited and the topic is rarely discussed in existing resources. 
The first group of academic publications relates to the theory of special operations 
and SOF roles and missions. In this group, William H. McRaven’s work1 comes to the 
forefront. McRaven’s theory exclusively treats direct action missions; these types of 
missions are now referred to as surgical strikes according to ARSOF-I 2022.2 McRaven 
presents six principles for surgical strike special operations in order to achieve relative 
superiority and conduct successful special operation missions. These principles address 
planners and practitioners of special operations and guide them in preparation and 
executing special operations. For senior level civilian and military leaders, McRaven’s 
                                                 
1 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1996). 
2 U.S. Army Special Operation Command, “ARSOF 2022 PART I,” Special Warfare 26, no. 2 (June 
2013). 
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work helps them to understand surgical strike special operations, but provides limited 
perspective to unravel the use of special operations beyond commando raids. 
Some scholars also focus on the broad principles that cover all types of special 
operations. Christopher Lamb’s work provides a broader understanding about SOF roles 
and missions. Lamb suggests three factors to assess SOF roles. These factors are the 
nature of the threats, the security environment we anticipate in the future, and the national 
security strategy to deal with these threats and the nature of the forces.3 Additionally, 
Lamb writes about four characteristics of special operations in order to understand 
whether a mission is a special operation or not. Furthermore, Lamb warns about the 
misuse of SOF by presenting the risks of inappropriate SOF missions. He asserts that 
inappropriate missions cause SOF to become more like conventional forces, and they 
may lose their unconventional character. Lamb’s work provides some valuable 
information for decision makers to assess whether a mission is special operation and is 
suitable for SOF.  
The second group of scholars’ works is about the growing importance of SOF in 
modern warfare. The academics in this group attempt to explain to decision makers the 
increasing importance of SOF from various perspectives. In this respect, Edward N. 
Luttwak claims that as the intensity of the war declines, the opponents become hard to 
define because they are dispersed.4 Low intensity warfare requires the following: flexible 
doctrine and units; cultural awareness; language ability; autonomous structure. 
Conventional forces are not appropriate to deal with low intensity threats, but SOF units 
are. Similarly, Colin Gray describes SOF as an innovation to address low intensity 
conflicts.5 Although understanding the growing importance of SOF by civilian and 
military decision makers makes them more interested in using SOF and to conduct 
                                                 
3 Christopher J. Lamb, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions,” Special Warfare 8 (July 
1995): 2. 
4 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters 13, no. 4 (December 1983): 14. 
5 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 273. 
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special operations, it does not mean that they are competent on how to properly execute 
such operation.   
The last group of scholars addresses the strategic value of SOF. This literature is 
directed toward decision makers. David Tucker and Christopher Lamb also contribute 
significantly to this literature. Their primary argument is that civilian and military 
decision makers need to realize the strategic value of special operation forces and special 
operations. In order to grasp the true strategic value of SOF for a nation, leaders should 
make the assessment of the security challenges to the nation.6 In other words, SOF’s 
strategic concept is associated with the national defense strategy for countering national 
threats. The appreciation of the strategic value of SOF should lead decision makers to 
prioritize missions for SOF and employ them properly. After determining the strategic 
value of SOF, Tucker and Lamb’s advice is that “SOF units need a strategic concept that 
explains their value to the nation in terms of roles and missions they are prepared to 
conduct.”7 Tucker and Lamb’s ideas are very useful for defining the strategic value of 
SOF in a broad sense, but decision makers need more detailed information to employ 
SOF properly and to direct special operations. 
Colin Gray focuses on the factors of properly using SOF and the results of 
misusing SOF. He is a leading writer about strategy and special operations. As a 
strategist, he emphasizes the strategic utility of SOF and the factors leading to success in 
special operations. He underscores that the strategic utility of special operations forces 
relies upon the understanding of its potential by civilian and military leaders.8 Besides 
strategic utility, Gray also draws attention to the misuse of special operation forces by 
stating: “The record of special operations is rife with cases in which the scarce assets of 
Special Forces were poorly employed.”9 It is obvious from Gray’s writings that a first 
                                                 
6 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 179. 
7 Ibid., 144. 
8 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 149. 
9 Ibid., 148. 
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step to employ SOF properly is to understand its strategic utility. However, it is 
insufficient to ensure proper use.  
In another writing,10 Gray examines the conditions for success and failure of 
special operations. He also says that it is impossible to identify all parameters that bring 
success and all settings that assure failure. Gray listed the following conditions, “policy 
demand, politics, feasible objectives, strategy, flexibility of mind, absence of alternatives, 
enemy vulnerabilities, technological assistance, tactical competence, reputation and 
history,” as beneficial for decision makers to grasp the conditions that may bring about 
SOF success.  
Lucien S. Vandenbroucke’s book11 examines the problems in the preparation and 
execution of U.S. strategic special operations that result in failure. Vandenbroucke 
identifies reasons for failure through examining four different cases. Furthermore, he 
offers suggestions for senior level civilian and military decision makers on how to use 
special operations forces properly.  
The literature review recognizes numerous factors that decision makers and senior 
level commanders need to know to employ special operation forces properly. SOF theory 
has been examined from various perspectives; this thesis asserts that no practical roles or 
activities have been identified to guide senior level decision makers in special operations. 
Consequently, my hope is that the thesis will make a contribution to fill the gap between 
the theoretical ideas, the level of control and the roles senior decision makers should 
perform.  
E. HYPOTHESES  
This thesis intends to examine the level of control exercised by senior decision 
makers in special operations. More specifically, the level of control and involvement of 
                                                 
10 Colin S. Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations 
Succeed?,” Parameters 29, no. 1 (1999): 2–24. 
11 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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senior decision makers in three phases of special operations—approval, preparation and 
execution—are the main concern of this thesis. This thesis also aims to examine three 
hypotheses that are related to the functions of decision makers in the three phases of 
special operations.  
1. Hypothesis 1  
The level of the decision makers’ control and involvement should be high in the 
approval phase of a special operation. For decision makers, deciding whether to approve 
a special mission or not is crucially important. Considering the consequences of a high-
risk special operation, the approval phase of the mission requires a high level of 
involvement by decision makers.  
2. Hypothesis 2  
The level of decision makers’ control and involvement should be medium in the 
preparation phase of a special operation. The role of senior decision makers does not end 
in the approval phase of a special operation; it continues in the preparation phase. SOF 
may need the support of the decision maker to be fully prepared for the mission. 
Therefore, decision makers should be ready to help SOF units to obtain all that is 
necessary for mission success. 
3. Hypothesis 3  
The level of decision makers’ control and involvement should be low in the 
execution phase of a special operation. The execution phase requires tactical knowledge. 
Accordingly, most decisions should be left to subordinate leaders. If decision makers 
intervene in the execution phase, this could hamper SOF’s ability to accomplish the 
mission, lower the chance of success, and bring unwanted consequences.   
F. APPROACH 
As stated previously, the aim of this thesis is to determine the appropriate level of 
senior decision maker involvement in special operations that are short-duration direct 
actions. The case studies are analyzed to gather information to test the hypotheses.  
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The thesis examines three hypotheses. Ultimately, this research will approve, 
disapprove, or modify the initial hypotheses, or produce a new hypothesis based on case 
analysis. Subsequently, the roles determined from the analysis may help prevent recurrent 
mistakes of senior decision makers and the resulting failure of a special operation. 
Moreover, although the theory and nature of special operations are complex, an 
understanding of these necessary and sufficient roles of senior decision makers will be 
useful to guide national leaders.   
The case selection includes both successful and unsuccessful surgical strike type 
special operations conducted by different nations’ SOF. The first criterion for selection is 
that senior decision makers took part in the approval, preparation, or execution phases of 
the mission. In this respect, the role of senior decision makers in each chosen case will be 
examined based on the hypotheses and identified principles. The second criterion is 
selecting cases that reflect future threats. Thus, the principles identified might be 
beneficial to senior decision makers from all nations. The third criterion requires that the 
cases selected have been documented in the literature. The last criterion is that the cases 
chosen from among the special operations have been conducted in the time period after 
World War II. 
According to the above criteria, four cases have been chosen for study. These 
cases are analyzed to specifically test the identified hypotheses. The first case is The Raid 
on Entebbe, which is also known as Operation Thunderbolt. Israeli special operation 
forces performed Operation Thunderbolt to rescue Jewish passengers of a skyjacked 
airplane that landed at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The operation was mainly a success; 
all hijackers and many Ugandan soldiers were killed, and most of the hostages were 
rescued, except three who died during the mission. In this operation, Israeli decision 
makers participated in the process of the operation.  
The Iranian Embassy Siege, or Operation Nimrod, is the second case. Six Iranian 
terrorists entered the Iranian Embassy in London by force and took the people in the 
embassy hostage in 1980. The British Special Air Service (SAS) conducted the assault to 
rescue the hostages. British decision makers were actively involved in the approval and 
preparation phases of the mission. 
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The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, which is also dubbed Operation Eagle Claw, is 
the third case. Operation Eagle Claw is an instructive historical example of special 
operations because of its convoluted nature and failure. U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 
who initiated the rescue, was an active figure the process of the operation. Additionally, 
many different units of the United States Armed Forces were used in the operation, which 
illustrates the complex nature of the operation and makes it a valuable case to view the 
roles of senior decision makers. 
The Dubrovka Music Theater Crisis (or Nord-Ost Seige) in Moscow is the fourth 
case. In 2002, Chechen rebels captured the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow and took 
hostages. Russian special operation forces, Spetsnaz, carried out a rescue operation by 
pumping an unknown chemical gas into the theater’s ventilation system then entering the 
theater. The result of the mission was tragic; hundreds of hostages were killed by toxic 
gas, not by bullets.  
After a brief summary of the conditions of each mission, the cases are divided 
into five sections which include the following: the “political-military situation” provides 
information about the situation before the crisis; the “concept of the operation and roles 
of decision makers” provide detailed information about how the decision makers behaved 
during the approval and preparation phases of the operation; the “mission execution and 
results” summarize the execution and results of the mission and provides information 
about how senior decision makers acted in the execution phase of the operation; the 
“assessment of the roles of decision makers” analyzes the roles of decision makers; and 
the “conclusion” evaluates the merits of case and their bearing on the research question 
and hypotheses.   
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II. CASE STUDIES 
A. OPERATION THUNDERBOLT (THE RAID ON ENTEBBE) 
The Israeli Special Forces’ hostage rescue operation at Entebbe Airport in Uganda 
remains one of the most daring special operations in history. Accordingly, examining the 
role of the decision makers in the operation can provide valuable insights. The rescue 
operation at Entebbe serves as a great example of effective decision maker involvement 
in the approval, preparation, and execution phases of a special operation. 
1. Political-Military Situation 
Operation Entebbe, which is also known as Operation Thunderbolt, was a 
counterterrorist hostage-rescue mission conducted by Israeli commandos in Uganda at 
Entebbe Airport on July 4, 1976. Before the incident, tensions between Israel and 
Palestinians were high. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were the two leading factions fighting against Israel in 
order to establish a free Palestine. In the 1960s and 1970s, both factions knew that they 
could not fight against superior Israeli forces. As a result, they began to hijack planes to 
get the attention of the international community and the Israeli authorities as well. The 
PFLP leadership, in particular, favored hijacking as a terrorist action.12 Other Palestinian 
groups, such as Black September, began to use the same type of terrorist tactic.13  
Since 1968, the Israeli government had dealt with the hijackings and other kinds 
of terrorist actions. The Israeli government’s reactions to all terrorist attacks were the 
same: reject any negotiation with terrorists. Before the Air France hijacking incident, the 
Israeli government responded to similar events with actions to rescue hostages.  
                                                 
12 Saul David, Operation Thunderbolt: Flight 139 and the Raid on Entebbe Airport, the Most 
Audacious Hostage Rescue Mission in History, First North American edition (New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2015), 11. 
13 Ibid., 12. 
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2. Concept of Operation and Roles of Decision Makers 
On June 27, 1976, four terrorists hijacked an Air France plane and its passengers. 
Two of the hijackers belonged to the PFLP External Operations; the other two were 
German terrorists who were members of the Revolutionary Cell.14 The route of the plane 
was from Israel to Paris. Terrorists took control by using handguns and hand grenades 
and directed the plane to the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. In Uganda, additional 
Palestinians joined the hostage takers; some units of the Ugandan Army also helped the 
hostage takers move the Israeli hostages from the plane into the building called the old 
terminal. On June 29, the terrorists announced their demands to the Israeli government. 
They wanted Israel to free 40 Palestinian prisoners and another 13 prisoners in four 
different countries: West Germany, Kenya, Switzerland, and France.15 Additionally, they 
stated that if the Israeli government did not meet their demands, they would begin to kill 
hostages on July 1.    
As soon as the Israeli government learned about the incident, Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin organized a crisis management team consisting of Minister of Defense 
Shimon Peres, Justice Minister Haim Zadok, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, 
Transportation Minister Gad Yaakobi, Minister without portfolio Yisrael Galili, Chief of 
Staff Motto Gur, and himself.16 Also, Israeli authorities directed a negotiation team to 
begin diplomatic contact with all the other governments related to the demands of the 
hostage takers.17 Another immediate step that the Israeli decision makers took was to 
alert the Sayeret Matkal, the Israeli counterterrorist unit, referred to as “the Unit.”18  
                                                 
14 Ibid., 49. 
15 Chaim Herzog, “The War Against Terrorism: Entebbe,” in From Troy to Entebbe: Special 
Operations in Ancient and Modern Times, ed. John Arquilla (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1996), 335. 
16 Simon Dunstan, Israel’s Lightning Strike: The Raid on Entebbe, 1976 (Oxford: Osprey, 2009), 13. 
17 Zeev Maoz, “The Decision to Raid Entebbe: Decision Analysis Applied to Crisis Behavior,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 (1981): 688. 
18 McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 333. 
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Israeli decision makers came together in numerous sessions to discuss viable 
options to resolve the hostage crisis. Israeli decision makers had different opinions about 
the solutions. Prime Minister Rabin was not comfortable with military solution for 
various reasons. His biggest concern was the lives of the hostages. Rabin’s other 
consideration was that a failed rescue mission with huge number of causalities would 
result in Israel’s loss of influence and friends. Failure would also end Rabin’s political 
career. Therefore, he was almost ready to accept the ultimatum of the terrorists.19 Rabin’s 
attitude remained unchanged, since there was still no reasonable military option. Just 
before July 1, Rabin advised the cabinet to submit to the demands of the terrorists and 
begin negotiations to save the hostages and bring them home alive. The cabinet members’ 
biggest concern was that by giving in to terrorist demands, they would encourage more 
terrorism against the Israeli people. The cabinet reluctantly approved the negotiation, but 
also approved, under pressure from Peres, efforts to continue to search for a feasible 
military option.20  
Shimon Peres, the Minister of Defense, opposed the negotiation from the very 
beginning. He persistently stressed that the Israeli government should reject the demands 
of the terrorists in order to deter terrorism in the future. However, he realized that other 
options had a very low probability of saving the hostages. Peres strongly believed that 
any solution other than negotiation would bring a better outcome in the future. He 
supported negotiations in order to gain time to come up with a military plan with 
acceptable risk. Therefore, he ordered the Israeli Chief of Staff, General Motto Gur, to 
find a military solution on the first day of the incident.21 
As a senior military decision maker, Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General 
Gur, supported a military option only if the risks were reasonable. Already he had 
ordered his staff and Israeli special forces to work on possible military options before 
                                                 
19 Herzog, “The War Against Terrorism: Entebbe,” 336. 
20 Tony Williamson, Counterstrike Entebbe (London: Harper Collins, 1976), 26. 
21 Herzog, “The War Against Terrorism: Entebbe,” 336. 
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joining the meetings with Israeli civilian decision makers. Major General Dan Shomron 
was in charge of reviewing military options. The planners of the operation left no stone 
unturned in gathering intelligence to shape the plan. With photographs of the Entebbe 
airport, the planners developed several military options. With little information, the 
planners ordered, the task force to rehearse the available options; the results were 
discouraging.22 
The terrorists changed the deadline to July 4, after the Israeli government 
announced that it would begin negotiations with the terrorists to release the prisoners. 
Even though Rabin’s initial intention was not to buy time for the military option, the 
negotiations gained more time for the task force. Furthermore, the terrorists released all 
non-Israeli hostages and segregated Israeli hostages. This made the incident the Israeli 
government’s problem alone.    
The segregation of Israeli hostages made the Israeli government more cautious 
about the negotiations. Ugandan President Idi Amin acted as the negotiator for the PFLP 
terrorists. However, the continuing negotiations with the Ugandan President revealed that 
he was working with the terrorists. As Amin’s support of the hijackers became clear, the 
Israeli decision makers considered replacing him with the United Nations Secretary 
General, Kurt Waldheim. But Amin would resist this attempt. The PFLP had already 
refused any United Nations intervention in the negotiation process. 
As the negotiations proceeded, Israeli decision makers realized that there was as 
much risk in the negotiation process as in the rescue mission. The Israeli government 
hesitated to accept the demands of the terrorists, since the government believed that there 
would be new demands to release the hostages. Thus, the Israeli decision makers became 
more inclined towards a military solution. The minister of Defense, Peres, ordered the 
chief of staff to work harder on a military operation. The task force was already working 
on several options. With the invaluable intelligence gathered from the released hostages, 
the task force finalized the rescue plan. General Shomron briefed the chief of staff and 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 335. 
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other high level commanders in the Israeli Armed Forces on the plan. Shomron had made 
all necessary coordination with the Israeli Air Force, Intelligence, and medical units.23 
In the meantime, the chief of staff and the minister of defense accepted the 
detailed plan that General Shomron presented. Peres, the Minister of Defense, called 
Prime Minister Rabin and said they were ready to brief a reasonable military plan. Rabin 
approved the plan, subject to the approval of the cabinet. The cabinet approved the rescue 
plan; the task force then took off from Israel route to the Entebbe Airport.24  
Meanwhile, Israeli decision makers continued negotiations with Ugandan 
authorities in order to preserve the secrecy of the rescue operation. Other senior military 
and civilian decision makers also acted to preserve secrecy of the operation. For instance, 
General Gur’s father-in-law had died; he attended the funeral to give the appearance that 
a military rescue mission was not contemplated.25 Similarly, ministers continued with 
their routine official receptions and other duties. 
Senior Israeli decision makers continuously intervened in the preparation process. 
For instance, the tactical planners experienced several problems with senior level military 
decision makers. The tactical commander of the rescue force was Yoni Netanyahu, who 
was killed during the operation. The chief of staff, Motto Gur, intervened several times to 
make tactical adjustments to the plan.26 Netanyahu shared his considerations with Gur, 
but Gur insisted on the changes that he ordered.  
General Shomron also intervened in the preparation phase, which was normal 
because his role was to manage the rescue plan. Though he would not participate in the 
tactical execution phase of the operation, he suggested using a larger force to control the 
Entebbe Airfield. Netanyahu and other tactical-level officers preferred using a smaller 
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and more mobile force.27 Shomron did not insist on his modification to the plan and left 
the final decision to the tactical commanders. Netanyahu and the other officers were 
happy that Shomron accepted the tactical commander’s position.  
The Israeli decision makers chose the best military unit in the Israeli Armed 
Forces, the Sayeret Matkal. Netanyahu, the commander of the Sayeret Matkal, also 
selected the best personnel. He picked the soldiers based on their combat experience and 
seniority. During the operation, the competence of the Sayeret Matkal soldiers was 
clearly evident. Although they had less than two days of preparation for the mission, the 
execution of the operation was almost flawless.  
3. Mission Execution and Results 
Operation Thunderbolt is one of the most famous and universally studied hostage 
rescue operations in history. The operation was a great success, since the hostages were 
rescued with few casualties while killing all the terrorists. The task force of the operation 
consisted of 100 highly trained Israeli commandos with battle experience.28 
The operation began on the night of July 4. The first plane landed, as planned, 
following the British cargo plane without causing suspicion to the Ugandan forces in the 
control tower. This was crucially important for the success of the operation. The rescue 
force reached the old terminal and killed all the terrorists while engaging Ugandan forces. 
The terrorists were caught by surprise. In the meantime, the second, third, and fourth 
Israeli airplanes landed at the airport as planned. The forces in the other planes secured 
the whole airport and made ready for evacuation of the hostages. As the Israeli Special 
Forces withdrew with the hostages, they destroyed 11 Ugandan MiG-17 fighter planes to 
prevent pursuit of the Israeli airplanes.29  
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General Shomron was with the task force during the rescue operation. He stayed 
with his headquarters as the guard unit and left with the last plane. It was a rare occasion 
that a senior level military commander moved with the rescue force.  
Operation Thunderbolt lasted 90 minutes from the landing in Entebbe until the 
last airplane took off. At the end of the operation, three of the hostages died because of 
the crossfire; one woman, who was in hospital, was never found. One of the task force 
soldiers had been killed in action.30 The rescue force killed 35 Ugandan soldiers and 
13 terrorists.31  
4. Assessment of the Roles of Decision Makers  
This assessment is based on this case study, and the decision makers’ roles in the 
three phases of a special operation: approval, preparation, and execution. 
a. In the Approval Phase 
The roles of decision makers in the approval phase of Operation Entebbe were 
significant. Israeli decision makers behaved based on their concerns and thoughts, and 
made moves to ensure the best solution for the crisis during the approval phase of the 
operation. Operation Thunderbolt was a risky operation. At first, Prime Minister Rabin 
was very anxious and against a military option because of the level of risk. For this 
reason, he wanted to try all other possible solutions before deciding on a rescue 
operation. Rabin tried peaceful options first. He tried to put pressure on Idi Amin to help 
convince the terrorists to release the hostages through negotiations. After 48 hours, he 
convinced the cabinet to unanimously approve negotiations with the terrorists to free the 
hostages. Later on, the military decision makers developed with a detailed plan with 
acceptable risk. Prime Minister Rabin approved the plan and sent it to the cabinet. Rabin 
acted responsibly and examined the other options before approving the rescue operation, 
which was still a risky choice. In other words, Israeli government officials and defense 
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forces personnel accepted the risk and dealt with the pressure of the crisis after making 
the best decision. Operation Thunderbolt shows the senior Israeli decision makers acted 
properly before deciding to conduct a dangerous surgical strike operation.  
During the hostage crisis, the Israeli decision makers made several attempts to put 
international pressure on Idi Amin to encourage him to help free the hostages by talking 
to PFLP terrorists. The Israeli government contacted Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
to convince the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, to intercede.32 
After being sure that Amin was helping the terrorists based on the intelligence gathered 
from the interrogations of the released hostages, the Israeli decision makers stopped 
trying to put pressure on him. Meanwhile, government officials talked with the impatient 
relatives of the hostages to assure them the Israeli government was doing its best to end 
the crisis.  
Israeli Minister of Defense Peres was very strong-minded about neither 
negotiating with terrorists nor accepting their demands. He persistently advised the prime 
minister to reject all demands of the terrorists. Peres wanted to send a message to the 
terrorists that the Israeli government would never agree to what they wanted in order to 
deter future terrorist actions. He also wanted to send a message to the international 
community that there is a way to fight terrorists without acceding to their demands. 
Furthermore, Israeli decision makers sent a message to the Israeli people that the Israeli 
government cares about its citizens and will do what is necessary to save them, even 
outside of the Israeli borders. Consequently, Operation Thunderbolt is a good example of 
the important role of decision makers in sending messages to both the domestic and 
international communities. The successful rescue mission showed the world that there is 
a way to fight terrorists regardless of the circumstances. 
Prime Minister Rabin was clear about the consequences of failure of the rescue 
operation. It would mean that he would have to resign. According to the existing 
literature, Rabin was willing to sacrifice his political career. It is a good example of a 
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politician and senior decision maker caring for his country’s citizens more than for his 
political future. Rabin preferred negotiations to release the hostages but ultimately 
accepted huge personal risk by approving the rescue operation.  
b. In the Preparation Phase 
First, Israeli decision makers chose the right units to conduct the operation. The 
task force consisted of the best trained and experienced soldiers who were members of 
the counterterrorist and commando units. Additionally, the Air Force pilots who took part 
in the operation were among the most experienced pilots. The detailed plan, smooth 
execution, and the result of the operation serve as proof of the task force’s proficiency. 
They killed all the terrorists, and lost one of their men and three hostages.  
Second, Israeli decision makers continued negotiations to buy more time for the 
preparation of the operation. In Operation Thunderbolt, the decision makers initially 
began the diplomatic negotiations with the Ugandan authorities and other countries where 
the prisoners were held in order to understand the positions of these authorities on the 
matter. Because of the fact that the chief of staff could not quickly come up with a 
reasonable military plan, the Israeli Prime Minister asked the cabinet to approve 
negotiations with the terrorists. In fact, Rabin did not seek to gain time for a better plan; 
he was ready to accept the demands of the terrorists for the release of the prisoners, since 
Israel could not get all the people the terrorist wanted released. Other countries may not 
care about the terrorist demands because their citizens were not in Entebbe. Peres thought 
that a couple more days would be very beneficial to develop a better rescue plan. The 
time gained by this move helped the planners. They received crucial intelligence from the 
released hostages. With this intelligence, planners reduced the level of risk from high to 
acceptable, and finalized the plan within the time that the negotiations took place. After 
approving the rescue plan, the Israeli decision makers continued the negotiations to gain 
more time and create surprise during the rescue operation.  
Third, during the crisis, the decision makers competently coordinated all key 
aspects of the decision-making process. The agencies involved included the Defense 
Ministry, Israeli Armed Forces, and the Israeli Intelligence Agency, Mossad. In the 
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preparation phase, the military decision makers reached all other agencies and units in 
order to create a better plan with less risk. Mossad had responded to the intelligence 
needs of Israeli Special Forces and the Israeli Government. The task force organized a 
specialized medical unit to provide immediate treatment for the possible wounded 
personnel and hostages by coordinating with medical units.  
In the preparation and the execution phase, the Israeli decision makers behaved 
responsibly to preserve the secrecy of the rescue mission. General Gur went to the funeral 
of his father-in-law; some of ministers participated in routine receptions. Their actions 
helped to conceal the rescue plan.  
c. In the Execution Phase 
Senior level Israeli decision makers’ roles during the execution phase of the 
operation were minimal. The tactical commander was the one responsible for the 
execution. However, one of the senior military decision makers, General Shomron, 
moved with the task force to Entebbe and was the last man to leave the scene, a rare 
occurrence in such operations. General Shomron was there in case anything unexpected 
came up. He did not intervene during the tactical assault; he just reported to Tel-Aviv to 
keep them updated on the progress of the operation. Therefore, General Shomron’s 
presence was negligible during the tactical phase of the operation. 
5. Conclusion 
Operation Thunderbolt is a valuable case to examine the roles of decision makers 
in a crisis situation that require a special operation as a solution. In the approval, 
preparation, and execution phases, Israeli civilian and military decision makers provide 
good examples for future decision makers. Consequently, examining the roles of Israeli 
decision makers during the crisis helps to better understand the subject of this thesis.  
B. OPERATION NIMROD  
Operation Nimrod was a special operation conducted by the British Special 
Forces unit: Special Air Service (SAS) in London at the Iranian Embassy on May 5, 
1980. Operation Nimrod is one of the most successful special operations in SOF history. 
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Examining the roles of senior British decision makers during the operation can provide a 
better understanding of the topic of the thesis.  
1. Political-Military Situation 
Khuzestan is an oil-rich region in southwestern Iran which is highly populated 
with Arabs who are culturally and ethnically different from the Persians. The inhabitants 
of the region also call it “Arabistan.” Khuzestan is the primary source of the Iran’s wealth 
and power because of its oil resources. The region is very important for Iran; Iran would 
be a powerless country in the Middle East without Khuzestan’s oil.33  
Khuzestan was autonomous under Arab Sheiks until the Shah suppressed their 
rights and put Persian rulers in power. The Shah altered the status of the region to a 
province and changed the name from Arabistan to Khuzestan.34 The Khuzestanis rebelled 
several times to re-gain a self-rule. The Shah severely repressed these uprisings. During 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Khuzestanis went on strike and stopped the oil flow from 
the region to help topple the autocratic Shah regime. After the Islamic Revolution, the 
Khuzestanis expected to regain their self-rule, but the new regime also destroyed the 
dream of Khuzestan’s autonomy. The frustrated Khuzestanis reacted violently and 
destroyed oil industry facilities. The violence caused significant damage to the oil 
industry and decreased oil exports to under a million barrels a day, which resulted in an 
80 percent decline.35 Meanwhile, the deterioration of relations between Iran and Iraq had 
an effect upon the Khuzestan cause. President Saddam Hussein’s concern was to prevent 
the Iranian-inspired36 Islamic fundamentalism among the Shia population of Iraq. If the 
new Islamic Iranian regime became strong in the region, Hussein might have faced a 
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stability problem in Iraq. Therefore, Iraq increased its support to the separatist Khuzestan 
movement to disturb the new Islamic Iranian regime.  
The Khuzestani people were struggling to find enough support to stand against the 
Islamic Iranian regime. Besides Hussein, many Arab countries and the rest of the world 
were not aware of the Khuzestani people’s problems. The members of the Democratic 
Revolutionary Front of the Liberation of Arabistan thought that calling the rest of the 
world’s attention to the plight of Khuzestan was necessary to gain international support 
against Iran’s new regime. They decided to attack the Iranian Embassy in London to 
showcase the Khuzestani people’s difficulties to the international community, especially 
to other Arab communities all around the world.37   
In Iran, the takeover of the U.S. embassy continued, and the Americans in the 
embassy were still hostages. The attack on the Iranian Embassy in London made the 
international community watch the new Iranian regime’s response to the incident. The 
Iranian government condemned the seizure of the Iranian embassy but blamed Iraq, the 
United States, and England. The Iranian Embassy siege resulted in the alienation of the 
Iranian regime in the eyes of the Western public and helped to publicize the cause of the 
Khuzestanis. 
2. Concept of Operation and Roles of Decision Makers 
On April 30, 1980, six Iranian Arabs from Khuzestan attacked the Iranian 
Embassy in London, which was located at 16 Princes Gate, and took the people in the 
embassy hostage. The hostages were chiefly Iranian embassy staff but also included a 
number of tourists and two BBC personnel who were in the embassy to pick up visas. 
The total number of hostages was 26.38 The group identified themselves as members of 
the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan, which sought 
independence for the oil-rich southwestern region of Iran, Khuzestan.39 The leader of the 
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hostage takers was Oan, codenamed Salim. His demands were autonomy for “Arabistan” 
(Khuzestan), the release of 91 Arabian detainees from Iranian prisons, and safe passage 
for them.40 The hostage takers declared the deadline as noon on Thursday, May 1. If their 
demands were not met, they would blow up the embassy with the hostages inside. 
As soon as the British government had became aware of the incident, the 
Metropolitan Police and cordoned off the area. The police were not the only force 
involved; the SAS was aware of the crisis from the beginning. The commander of the 
22 SAS, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Rose, ordered his team to be on 24-hour standby to 
conduct a hostage rescue operation after receiving a call from a former SAS soldier who 
was working with the Metropolitan Office. Afterward, Colonel Rose tried to get 
confirmation from his headquarters; then, the SAS headquarters asked to obtain 
confirmation from the Ministry of Defense. When competent authorities failed to respond 
to his question with a definitive answer, he decided to go to London to conduct a 
preliminary reconnaissance before receiving an official order from the headquarters.41 
The official order came six hours later from the Minister of Defense when Colonel Rose 
was already on the scene. 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher preferred not to directly intervene in the 
management of the crisis and delegated that authority to the “Home Secretary,”42 
William Whitelaw. With the police securing the area, Whitelaw gathered a crisis 
management team consisting of senior members of the Home Office, the Ministry of 
Defense, the Foreign Office, the Metropolitan Police, MI6, MI5, a representative of 
SAS—de la Billiere—and the public utilities including the gas board, the water board, 
and the British Airports Authority in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBRA).43 
The COBRA served as the British government’s emergency committee to observe 
and administer the efforts to solve the evolving crisis. As a leader of the COBRA, 
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Whitelaw was never autocratic; he always let people express their ideas and concerns. 
Before every critical decision, he brought the problem into a discussion without leaving 
anything in the air.44 
During the crisis, Whitelaw kept in contact with the prime minister. Thatcher and 
Whitelaw were on the same page about the strategy that included four criteria. First, the 
police would continue the negotiations to end the crisis peacefully. Second, if hostage 
takers shot anybody without killing them, the military rescue option would be considered. 
Third, the SAS would get the green light to go in only if the hostage takers killed 
anybody. Fourth, under no circumstances would the negotiators promise to let the hostage 
takers out of England as free people.45 
Even though Thatcher was not present in the COBRA, she laid down three 
principles to guide the COBRA. First, the United Kingdom’s laws would be applied to 
the crisis even though the hostage taking event was in a foreign embassy. Second, under 
no circumstances would the hostage takers be allowed to leave the country as free agents. 
Last, the first priority would be a peaceful solution. Thatcher’s priority was to not risk 
hostages’ lives, but at the same time, she wanted to show the international community 
that terrorism should be defeated.46 
The Iranian government’s reaction to the crisis made the situation more 
complicated. The Iranian foreign minister acknowledged to British decision makers that 
Iran would not meet any of the terrorists’ demands. 47 Furthermore, Iran announced that 
if any of the hostages were killed by terrorists, the same number of Iranian Arabs would 
be executed.48 The foreign minister also accused the United States and the Central 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) of being behind the incident. The Iranian government’s 
attitude put all responsibilities on the British authorities.  
After reaching the scene, the 22 SAS Task Force members settled into a building 
close to the Iranian Embassy and immediately planned for an emergency rescue. In order 
to reduce the risk, the SAS team needed more time and intelligence. The intelligence 
service was trying to get intelligence about the building, hostage takers, and even the 
hostages. In this respect, the intelligence service gathered important information about 
the interior of the building from the people who recently visited the embassy and from 
the first released hostage. Also, the planners wanted real-time intelligence from the inside 
of the building. Thus, the intelligence service decided to place listening devices on walls 
adjacent to the embassy. The walls were too thick for planting those devices, so the 
agents had to thin the walls. The noise of the thinning work would need to be covered by 
something loud. The decision makers in the COBRA coordinated with airport authorities 
to make several airplanes fly at low altitudes to cover the noise of the preparations to 
install the listening devices.49 In the meantime, the negotiation process continued to try to 
end the crisis peacefully while gaining time for the planners and the intelligence 
gathering efforts. 
In the meantime, the first deadline passed without any problems. Salim, the leader 
of the hostage takers, released many women hostages and a BBC member who had a 
severe stomach condition. But, the situation inside the Iranian Embassy was getting 
worse day by day. In addition to the previous demands, Salim wanted three ambassadors 
from any Arab countries to act as negotiators in order to be able to get out of the country 
with his men by plane. The British decision makers did not feel comfortable with the idea 
of foreign diplomat mediators. The decision makers’ major concern was how to control 
the situation if forced to use negotiators whom they could not trust. Furthermore, the new 
demand was not consistent with one of Thatcher’s principles: do not let the terrorists 
escape. The next day, May 2, Salim wanted to make an announcement on the BCC and 
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wanted a reporter to come and take this statement. He also insisted that the announcement 
be aired exactly as it was written by him. However, the BBC did not make the 
announcement as he wanted; they misrepresented his announcement and did not mention 
that the hostage takers wanted the Arab diplomats in England to negotiate with the British 
Government. Thus, the tension in the hostage situation rose.50 
The reluctance of the British decision makers to consider working with Arab 
negotiators slowed the process of contacting Arab countries’ embassies. At this juncture, 
the attitude of the British decision makers and the inaccurate statement of the BBC made 
Salim furious. Salim threatened to kill a hostage unless the BBC corrected its 
announcement by 2100 hours. The decision makers let the BBC correct the previous 
announcement to ease the tension. The announcement was made as the hostage takers had 
demanded. Thus, the hostage takers released another hostage.51 
In the next two days, May 4 and 5, negotiations with the hostage takers continued, 
but the British Government did not make any promise to them and did not bring any Arab 
negotiators, as the hostage takers had demanded. The COBRA did not respond to the 
consistent messages from police negotiators about the demand for an Arab negotiator. 
This problem almost brought negotiations to a standstill. Additionally, the strange noises 
around the embassy building and in its walls made the hostage takers think the police 
were planning a rescue operation. Therefore, the tension in the embassy increased again 
when the hostage takers threatened for the second time to kill hostages if their demands 
were not met in 45 minutes. Then, three shots were heard. The negotiators could not be 
sure about what happened. De la Billiere, the director of SAS, reported the shots to the 
COBRA in order to get permission to begin military operation. But, the Home Secretary 
was not present.52 
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After the call, the Home Secretary immediately came to London to discuss the 
military operation. In the COBRA, Home Secretary Whitelaw and the other members of 
the crisis management team examined all details of the military plan. De la Billiere 
summarized the military option and rehearsals that the SAS teams had done. At the end, 
Whitelaw approved the plan by telling de la Billiere that he would not interfere; and if the 
military operation failed, he would take full responsibility.53 Then, de la Billiere ordered 
the SAS teams to be ready to take their positions and conduct a rescue operation on short 
notice. The SAS teams were ready to assault with ten minutes notice.  
The negotiators made their last attempt to ease the tension inside the embassy by 
bringing an imam to talk to the leader of the hostage takers.54 But Salim refused to talk 
with the imam; three more shots were heard from the embassy. After some time, a dead 
body was thrown outside from the main entrance of the embassy building. When medical 
personnel examined the body, they realized that the hostage had been dead for hours. 
Now, the British decision makers were sure at least one hostage had been killed; the 
second one might have been killed as well. Whitelaw immediately contacted Thatcher to 
get her final approval.55 Thatcher approved the military rescue operation, and afterward, 
Whitelaw ordered de la Billiere to begin the operation; de la Billiere authorized the 
tactical commander, Colonel Rose, to conduct the operation.56  
While the SAS teams were positioning, the negotiators kept the leader of the 
hostage takers busy by continuing to talk with him in order to preserve the secrecy and 
create surprise during the operation. The best-trained military unit in the British Armed 
Forces, the SAS, was ready to rescue the hostages and eliminate the hostage takers. 
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3. Mission Execution and Results 
Operation Nimrod is one of the most famous hostage rescue operations in history. 
The operation was successful because the hostages were rescued with only a few 
casualties while neutralizing all the hostage takers. The task force for the operation 
consisted of two SAS teams that were named the Red Team and the Blue Team. All SAS 
soldiers ok highly trained professionals.  
The operation began at 1923 hours on May 5. The Red team was going to rappel 
from the roof of the building; simultaneously the Blue team was going to enter the 
building from the ground floor. The simultaneous entry was not achieved because of a 
pre-mature initiation. Even though the uncoordinated entrance warned the hostage takers, 
the SAS teams stormed the building by entering from two directions evacuating the 
hostages. During the assault, the hostage takers had killed one of the hostages and 
wounded two.57 The operation lasted 17 minutes.58 
During the operation, the senior decision makers in the COBRA monitored radio 
communications between the SAS teams. They did not intervene in the execution phase 
of the operation. After the operation, Whitelaw went to the scene to thank the SAS teams 
as they prepared to return to base.59  Prime Minister Thatcher visited the base of the SAS 
to congratulate the SAS soldiers who executed the rescue operation. She praised their 
bravery and professionalism and thanked them one by one.   
The British decision makers sent a clear message to the international community 
with Operation Nimrod that the British authorities do not make deals with terrorists and 
that any kind of terror actions inside Britain will not succeed. Additionally, the SAS’s 
success demonstrated SAS professionalism to the countries considering creating their 
own special units to combat terrorism.  
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4. Assessment of the Roles of Decision Makers 
This assessment is based on the decision makers’ roles are examined in the three 
phases of this special operation: approval, preparation, and execution. 
a. In the Approval Phase 
During the Iranian Embassy hostage-taking incident, Prime Minister Thatcher was 
not on the scene. Thatcher preferred to delegate her authority to the Home Secretary in 
the crisis. Her decision to delegate authority contributed to the flexibility of the decision-
making process in the COBRA. While delegating authority, Thatcher discussed her 
policies with the Home Secretary. Based on this discussion, the COBRA managed the 
crisis without further problem or hesitation. Early framing of the rules of engagement and 
principles provided clear direction for the agents who took part in handling the crisis. 
Additionally, Thatcher was always in contact with the Home Secretary in case of 
emergency situations and for final mission approval. Therefore, her absence in the 
COBRA did not negatively affect efforts to solve the crisis and contributed to flexibility. 
The British decision makers were not entirely successful in lowering the risk to 
the hostages prior operation. One of Thatcher’s principles was to negotiate with the 
hostage takers in order to reach a peaceful or less risky solution rather than conducting a 
hostage rescue operation. However, it is hard to claim that the British senior decision 
makers sought every opportunity to lower the risk to the hostages; neither did they 
attempt less risky solutions. First of all, the demands of the hostage takers were not 
consistent with the principles that the senior British decision makers agreed on. Secondly, 
the British decision makers decided to stall rather than meet the demands. But, this 
attitude made the hostage takers nervous and increased the risk to the hostages. Lastly, 
the British decision makers did not bring any other solutions to the table while 
negotiating with the hostage takers.  
For instance, the British decision makers did not accept the request for Arab 
diplomatic negotiators. They did not do anything to appease the hostage takers and keep 
them calm. The decision makers ignored demands and caused two lives to be lost before 
fully realizing the seriousness of the situation. However, the British decision makers 
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might have offered other options to the hostage takers, such as considering diplomats 
from other nationalities as negotiators. Thus, they could have kept the hostage takers 
calm and gained more time for a less risky solution. The British decision makers were not 
very careful with the lives of the hostages in this regard.  
Furthermore, the initial plan for the rescue operation was not perfect. As time 
progressed, the planners improved the plan based on available intelligence. The British 
decision makers approved the plan only after the terrorists killed the two hostages. It is 
hard to understand why the British decision makers waited until the hostage takers had 
killed two people. They could have initiated the rescue after being sure that the 
operation’s risk was reasonable. Additionally, the British decision makers were 
aware that there was no possibility of meeting the demands of the hostage takers and 
that negotiations would not end with a peaceful solution. Therefore, continuing the 
negotiations until the killings was unnecessary, especially considering they had a rescue 
plan with acceptable risk.  
During the approval phase of the operation, the British decision makers did not 
spend much effort to gain international or public support to conduct the operation. The 
British authorities were eager to handle the crisis alone. Their not providing an Arab 
negotiator also illustrates this point. 
Prime Minister Thatcher did not want to unnecessarily risk hostages’ lives during 
the Iranian Embassy hostage taking incident; but above all, she wanted to demonstrate to 
the international community that terrorism must be defeated.60 The decision to send a 
message to the international community and terrorists worldwide resulted in two 
hostages’ lives being lost. However, it could have ended much worse. 
Approval of the military operation was a political decision. Whitelaw displayed 
great leadership giving his approval for the military rescue operation. He assured de la 
Billiere that he would not interfere; and if the operation failed, he would take full 
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responsibility. Whitelaw’s attitude impressed his subordinates, especially de la Billiere.61 
He showed that he was ready to shoulder responsibility rather than protect his career.  
b. In the Preparation Phase 
First, in the preparation phase, the British decision makers chose the best unit in 
the British Armed Forces, the SAS. The rescue task force consisted of the best-trained 
soldiers; they were specially trained for counterterrorism operations. The SAS’s 
professionalism, detailed planning, and bravery of the teams produced success. 
Second, the decision makers initially approved negotiations in order to solve the 
problem peacefully. However, the demands of the hostage takers were contrary to the 
policies that the Prime Minister and other senior decision makers agreed upon. This fact 
reduced the chance of successful negotiations and led the decision makers to think more 
seriously about the military rescue. Thus, after the announcement of the demands, the 
role of the negotiations became an effort to gain time for the military operation and 
convince the hostage takers to release as many hostages as possible. Although 
negotiations gained some time for the planners and the intelligence service, two hostages 
died during the negotiation process.   
Third, during the crisis, the British decision makers displayed good coordination. 
The operation benefited from the coordinated work of the COBRA. The members of the 
COBRA responded quickly to the needs of the SAS. For instance, in the preparation 
phase of the operation, the military planners needed exact intelligence in order to improve 
their plan and lessen the risk of the operation. The intelligence service, MI5, responded 
quickly to the demand of the military planners and planted listening devices on the walls 
between the Iranian Embassy and the Ethiopian Embassy. The responsive coordination of 
the COBRA solved the problem. The airport authorities changed the route for landing 
planes, which covered the noise of the thinning of the walls. In normal times, this would 
take days because of bureaucratic procedures. The decision to establish COBRA made 
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the coordination easy and responsive. The British decision makers were good at 
coordinating among themselves.  
The British decision makers could not display the same coordination ability while 
contacting Arab diplomats to convince them to be negotiators. The British decision 
makers preferred to go slow. Thatcher might have accelerated the process, but she 
decided to delegate her authority to the Home Secretary. Because of the slow process to 
find Arab diplomats, the hostage-takers became angry and killed a hostage. Conceivably, 
if the British decision makers gave the impression of making every effort to convince 
Arabian diplomats to be negotiators, this may have kept the hostage takers calm, 
preserved the secrecy of the rescue attempt, and gained more time for the planners.     
c. In the Execution Phase 
Senior civilian and military decision makers’ intervention during the execution of 
the operation was minimal. They monitored radio communications between the SAS 
teams during the execution without intervening. Colonel Rose, the tactical commander, 
was in charge of the operation. After the operation, Prime Minister Thatcher went to the 
base of the SAS soldiers to congratulate them. She praised their success and 
professionalism and thanked them. Thatcher’s behavior was an exemplar of a decision 
maker who stands behind the men who take great risk in serving their country.  
5. Conclusion 
Operation Nimrod is another valuable case for examining the roles of decision 
makers in special operations. The level of intervention of British decision makers in the 
approval, preparation, and execution phases provides valuable information for testing the 
hypotheses of the study.  
C. OPERATION EAGLE CLAW 
Operation Eagle Claw was the failed rescue attempt of 53 American hostages held 
in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979. The operation involved an insertion of a 
joint task force consisting of Delta Force, Rangers, U.S. Air Force pilots, and U.S. 
Marine Corps helicopter pilots to secure an area to use as a base for the rescue operation. 
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During the infiltration, several helicopters had mechanical problems, which led to 
aborting the mission. A helicopter hovered into a C130 as the force prepared to deport 
Iran, killing and injuring many of the participants. The rescue task force returned leaving 
crashed aircraft, equipment, documents, and casualties. A review of the operation brought 
significant changes in the U.S. Special Operations community. Examining Operation 
Eagle Claw sheds light on the topic of the roles of decision makers in special operations. 
1. Political-Military Situation 
For many years before the Islamic revolution, the relationship between Iran and 
the United States was very close. Iran was a dependable partner in the Middle East for the 
United States. The Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, provided a continual oil supply to the 
United States; in return, the United States provided military and economic aid to Iran. In 
1963, the Shah commenced the modernization of Iran through reforms. These reforms led 
to economic growth and modernization in the governmental institutions. However, 
Pahlavi’s reforms drew negative reactions from fundamentalist Iranians, especially from 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters.62  
The Shah responded severely to the negative reactions from Khomeini’s 
supporters. The repressive process made more people support Khomeini. In the 1970s, 
numerous strikes and demonstrations began to take place. In September 1978, the 
revolutionist Iranians toppled the Shah and sent him into exile. Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
returned from exile in France, took control of Iran and established the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Anti-Americanism strongly espoused by the new regime, began to spread among 
the Iranian people, particularly students. Anti-American students routinely conducted 
mass demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. After learning that the 
toppled Shah was in the United States for medical treatment, the students became furious 
and gathered to attack the U.S. Embassy.63 
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2. Concept of Operation and Roles of Decision Makers 
On November 4, 1979, a growing number of anti-American Iranian students were 
protesting in front of the U.S. Embassy.64 The crowd was chanting to get back the shah 
for the revolutionary government to try him. Tension among the crowd rose as more and 
more people gathered. Then the protesters stormed the U.S. Embassy, swarmed the 
embassy’s compound within minutes, and captured 66 American citizens and took them 
hostage. Afterward, the hostage takers made an announcement to declare their demand. 
The demand was the capture and deportation of the exiled Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, so that he could be tried in an Iranian court for his regime’s human rights 
violations. At the time, the shah was in the United States for medical treatment. The U.S. 
government refused to extradite the shah because of the high probability of his execution. 
This made the situation more serious. The hostage takers threatened to interrogate the 
U.S. hostages and keep them blindfolded. Moreover, the Iranian government asserted that 
they could not control the hostage takers. They claimed that the hostage takers would 
decide the destiny of the hostages in the embassy.65 
President Jimmy Carter’s first reaction to the incident was underscoring the vital 
importance of the hostages’ lives. President Carter’s priority was to secure the safe 
release of the hostages by conducting indirect negotiations with the Iran regime via the 
intervention of the United Nations. After a week of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate 
with the new regime and the hostage takers, the U.S. government enacted economic 
sanctions against Iran and froze Iranian bank accounts in U.S. banks. During the first few 
months of the crisis, the U.S. government and the United Nations again made numerous 
efforts for the release of the hostages. The UN secretary-general met with Iran’s new 
government officials during the incident, but the result was not promising. The United 
States government also tried to cajole its allies to impose sanctions on Iran. By late 
March 1980, Carter began to realize that the negotiation process was not going to be 
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successful. At the meeting on March 22, Carter approved a reconnaissance aircraft be 
sent into Iranian air space to find a suitable landing site for a rescue force, which meant 
American decision makers moving towards a military rescue operation. Almost all top 
decision makers were in agreement about a rescue mission.66 
President Carter already approved examining possible military options within two 
days after the seizure of the U.S. Embassy. Initial estimates of the chance of success were 
very low because of various difficulties: logistics, infiltration, reaching the embassy, and 
exfiltration from Tehran. Despite this, planners continued to seek a feasible plan and 
solutions for complicated logistical issues. Meanwhile, the core element of the rescue 
force was training. The planning process continued secretly along with negotiations.67 
Unfortunately, it was obvious that the negotiation process was not successful at 
releasing the hostages. Furthermore, the American presidential election was near. 
Therefore, the decision whether to conduct a rescue operation or not had to be made 
quickly. Three important meetings took place to discuss the operation. The first meeting 
was on March 22. In this meeting all top American decision makers agreed to think 
seriously about a rescue mission option. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s 
National Security Adviser, almost all top decision makers were on the same page about a 
rescue operation if negotiations failed.68 The second meeting on April 11 was key 
because President Carter informed his cabinet that he had authorized the military rescue 
mission.69 The discussions at the March 22 meeting foreshadowed the decision taken on 
April 11. In the final meeting on April 15, American decision makers listened to the 
details of the rescue operation. This meeting was the last time that American decision 
makers discussed the operation. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who was the only a key 
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official against the operation, stated his doubts about the decision. Nevertheless, Carter 
did not change his mind about the rescue mission.70 
Secretary Vance objected to the rescue operation for various reasons. He 
maintained that the United States should not conduct a rescue operation because hostages 
were not in physical danger.71 Vance also asserted that Khomeini was using hostages to 
strengthen his control in Iran. Another reason for his opposition to a military rescue 
mission was that a rescue attempt would risk the hostages’ lives, and endanger U.S. 
interests and American people in the region. Vance also assumed that a military assault 
might create increased anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.    
However, National Security Advisor Brzezinski supported a rescue mission from 
the beginning. He talked with President Carter and advised him to begin the preparation 
process. He asserted that a rescue mission was a “moral and political obligation to the 
hostages, and was a matter of national honor.”72 Brzezinski also claimed that a rescue in 
Tehran would serve as a deterrent against the Soviets and rest of the world as well. 
President Carter accepted the idea and appointed Brzezinski as a coordinator to oversee 
the preparation process of the rescue mission.73 Brzezinski organized a special 
coordination committee to plan the rescue. The committee consisted of Brzezinski, 
Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the director of CIA, 
General David Jones as Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lt. General John S. Pustay as his 
assistant.74 As a director of the committee, although he had no authority over the other 
members and planners, Brzezinski maintained strict control of the preparation process. 
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Other members resented Brzezinski’s attitude during the committee meetings.75 
Furthermore, he often interfered with the planners by over-supervision.76   
Major General James B. Vaught was responsible for the security of the 
preparation process and operational details or the rescue mission. The Army chief of staff 
nominated Vaught to lead the rescue task force. Vaught experienced various problems 
while leading the rescue mission. Many things that had to be done before the rescue 
mission could not be done because of security considerations. Security considerations 
also restricted the efforts of establishing a Joint Task Force. To preserve secrecy in the 
preparation phase, the rescue task force did not do full-scale rehearsals.77 Moreover, 
overemphasizing security precautions hindered communication between the rescue force 
units during the infiltration of the rescue operation.78  
Another problem General Vaught faced was the unclear chain of command for the 
rescue task force. Major General Philip G. Gast, of the U.S. Air Force, who was senior to 
General Vaught, was appointed as special consultant to the rescue task force. During the 
preparation process, Vaught faced numerous intelligence-related problems. Lack of CIA 
agents in Tehran negatively affected the planning. Photos of the embassy were not 
available, which added to the preparation time. The hostages’ exact location was 
unknown until the last minute. This information was important to save time in the 
embassy searching for hostages. Colonel Charlie Beckwith, the commander of the ground 
force for the operation, would receive the intelligence about the hostages’ location at the 
very last minute and modified the assault plan accordingly.79 According to Beckwith, the 
majority of the intelligence was untested and coming from different systems, which made 
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the planners spend more time on raw information.80 In addition, the Special Operation 
Review Group stated in its report that the Intelligence Community was slow in 
responding to the intelligence requests of the planners.81 
After the approval of the mission, the rescue task force leaders met with President 
Carter in the White House on April 16, 1980, to present the details of the Operation Eagle 
Claw.82 Carter asked several questions about possible challenges during the operations. 
Additionally, he directed the force commanders to be sure not to harm innocent people 
and eschew killing whenever possible.83 Carter wanted to limit the size of the rescue 
force to prevent unwanted loss of life. Carter’s concern was to avoid the eagerness of the 
rescue force to engage in gunfire with Iranians by limiting the size of the rescue force. 
The rescue mission was not to be perceived as an aggressive, punitive military action, but 
a humanitarian mission designed to save American lives.84  
The rescue task force consisted of Delta Force, U.S. Rangers, U.S. Air Force 
pilots, and U.S. Marine Corps helicopter pilots. Delta Force consisted of the best-trained 
Special Operators in the U.S. Army. Air force pilots and marine helicopter pilots were 
chosen very carefully according to their experience and night flight ability.85 
Nevertheless, some Marine helicopter pilots did not have the necessary experience for the 
mission.86 Furthermore, the operators did not have any joint training or even any joint 
procedures to be able to conduct a difficult mission like Operation Eagle Claw.87  
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3. Mission Execution and Results 
In the early hours of April 24, 1980, the rescue force consisting 130 Delta Force 
operators, U.S. Rangers, U.S. Air Force pilots, and U.S. Marine Corps helicopter pilots 
flew into the Iranian desert, to Desert One. Delta Force, infiltrating on MC130s, reached 
the designated place on time without problems. However, it was not the same for the 
helicopter pilots because of the weather. One helicopter landed in the desert because of a 
malfunction on its blade; the pilots decided not to fly the helicopter further and 
abandoned it. Additionally, the second helicopter returned because of another mechanical 
problem. Six helicopters reached Desert One 85 minutes behind schedule. Unfortunately, 
one of the six remaining helicopters had a mechanical problem in Desert One. Five 
helicopters remained for the rest of the mission, but six helicopters were the minimum 
requirement to continue the mission.88  
Beckwith decided to abort the mission when he was told that only five helicopters 
were left to fly to Desert Two. Beckwith knew he needed at least six helicopters because 
he expected to lose another two helicopters during the exfiltration. Once the Carter 
Administration learned about Beckwith’s decision, Brzezinski advised President Carter to 
continue with five helicopters. Beckwith was upset about the request, and would not 
change his decision. Consequently, Carter supported the decision to abort the mission 
based on the recommendations from Beckwith.89  
After aborting the mission, one helicopter crashed into a C-130 during exfiltration 
while taking off. Both aircraft exploded; huge flames raged toward the other aircraft. 
Unfortunately, eight U.S. soldiers—five Air Force personnel and three Marines—died in 
Desert One. The bodies of the Americans were left behind during the panic and 
confusion, as were several intact helicopters, equipment, maps, and other material.90  
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Carter made a public speech to tell the American people that he took full 
responsibility for the failed rescue operation. He also promised to continue to take every 
opportunity to save the hostages. Later on, the failure caused the precipitous decline of 
Carter’s popularity in the eyes of the American people; he lost his reelection.91 
The hostage-taking incident continued for 444-days; the situation greatly affected 
both the United States and Iran. In the summer of 1980, the death of the shah in Egypt 
and the election of a new Iranian parliament eased the tensions on both sides and 
restarted negotiations. Khomeini declared several conditions for releasing the hostages. 
The U.S. government ignored the declaration. Afterward, the Iranians approved 
mediation by Algerian representatives. On January 18, 1981, the Iranian government 
signed an agreement in Algiers.92 Soon afterward, the U.S. government unfroze Iran’s 
financial assets in the U.S. banks. The 52 hostages were released and the hostage crisis 
was over.   
4. Assessment of the Roles of Decision Makers 
This assessment is based on the case study. Decision makers’ roles are examined 
in three phases of this special operation: approval, preparation, and execution. 
a. In the Approval Phase 
The senior American decision makers’ roles were substantial in the approval 
phase of Operation Eagle Claw. American decision makers had different views about the 
solution to the hostage incident based on their concerns. Initially, President Carter was 
against any military action because he believed it would risk lives. Considering the range, 
logistical problems, and lack of intelligence, President Carter was right. For this reason, 
Carter began to seek ways to negotiate with the hostage takers and the new Iranian 
regime, which seemed less risky and wiser. However, negotiations could not free the 
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hostages. Prolonged captivity began to put more pressure on the American decision 
makers and led them to consider the high-risk military option. They tried less risky 
options for more than five months before deciding to conduct the rescue operation. 
However, by the time the rescue mission was executed, the hostages’ lives were not 
under direct threat. None of the hostages had been killed or threatened before the 
execution of the mission. Thereby, one can conclude that the decision to conduct the 
rescue mission was not the last option for the American decision makers. Because of the 
high risk of the rescue operation, decision makers should have only approved the rescue 
mission if the hostages’ lives were severely threatened by the hostage takers. Therefore, 
American decision makers appear to have ignored less risky options because of the 
pressure of upcoming elections and the prolonged hostage incident.  
During the hostage crisis, the American decision makers took several steps to 
apply international pressure on the new Iranian regime. First, the American government 
contacted its allies to convince them to impose economic sanctions along with the United 
States. Additionally, President Carter used the UN to try to force the new Iranian regime 
to release the hostages. In this respect, the UN Secretary served as a negotiator. 
Apparently, the American decision makers tried international pressure as a less risky 
option to solve the crisis before deciding on a rescue mission. 
National Security Advisor Brzezinski was a dedicated supporter of a rescue 
mission because he saw the crisis as an opportunity to send a message to the Soviet 
Union and the rest of the world. According to Brzezinski, the rescue operation would 
show the power of the United States to conduct a special operation anywhere in the 
world. Additionally, Brzezinski perceived the crisis as a matter of American honor; the 
crisis cast doubt on the American power. Thus, while deciding to conduct a rescue 
mission, the American decision makers also aimed to send a message to the Soviet 
Union, allies in the region, and the rest of the world. 
The upcoming elections might have served as a catalyst for the decision to 
execute the rescue mission. President Carter was running for reelection and polls showed 
that his popularity was decreasing among voters. This fact may have influenced Carter to 
approve the rescue mission. Carter’s career considerations may have affected his 
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decision. It is not fair to say, though, that he acted solely based only on his career 
concerns. Surely, his first priority was the hostages’ lives.  
b. In the Preparation Phase 
During the preparation phase, some of the American decision makers intervened 
more than necessary. The White House desire of keeping the rescue force small was an 
example of intervention.93 The need for secrecy was the primary reason for the Carter 
Administration’s attitude about a small rescue force. Their continuous interfering caused 
the planners and other senior decision makers to lose focus.94 Furthermore, deciding the 
number of helicopters used for the rescue mission was affected by Carter’s priority to 
demonstrate the humanitarian nature of the operation. According to Colonel Beckwith, 
they needed more helicopters at the beginning because of the helicopter’s 
undependability. However, General Vaught and the planners in the Pentagon thought that 
only eight helicopters could fit on the Nimitz.95 In fact, 12 helicopters could have taken 
off from the Nimitz.96 In addition to President Carter, National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski was another figure who unnecessarily interfered during the preparation phase 
of the mission. Because of the constant presence of senior decision makers, military 
commanders were not comfortable to make a decision according to their expertise. Senior 
American decision makers, especially President Carter, should have delegated their 
authority to get the best from their subordinates. 
American decision makers chose their best-trained unit as a ground force for the 
mission. Delta Force soldiers were specially trained for counterterrorism operations. U.S. 
Air Force pilots were chosen according to their experience and talents. Nevertheless, the 
U.S. Marine Corps pilots were not trained for long-range night flying. Only the Air Force 
helicopter pilots had this experience. The units chosen for the mission lacked joint 
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training. The helicopter pilots chosen for the mission were not sufficiently familiar with 
the aircraft they were tasked to fly.  
During the preparation, coordination between government agencies was 
inadequate. At the beginning of the preparation phase, the planners did not have 
sufficient information to develop a plan.97 Transferring the necessary intelligence to help 
the planners develop a rescue plan was not performed well. Additionally, the necessary 
intelligence to rehearse the mission was not provided to the ground force. Even the exact 
location of hostages inside the embassy came at the very last minute.98 These last minute 
updates caused last minute adjustments in training, logistics, and personnel requirements. 
Weather intelligence also was not passed to pilots before the execution of the operation.  
In the preparation phase, the decision makers were overly sensitive about the 
secrecy of the rescue mission. Their consistent caveats about secrecy put more pressure 
on the planners and the executors of the operation. Additionally, unnecessary security 
concerns also constrained efforts to establish a joint task force structure.  
c. In the Execution Phase 
The role of senior level American leaders during the execution phase of the 
operation was insignificant. They did not intervene in the execution of the operation until 
the abort decision, which was an appropriate point of senior level involvement. When 
Beckwith decided to abort the mission, the decision makers asked him again if the 
mission was possible with the remaining helicopters.99 The intervention of the decision 
makers by questioning Beckwith’s decision was not appropriate. If Beckwith continued 
the mission with five helicopters, the operation might have been a greater tragedy for the 
rescue task force and the hostages. 
                                                 
97 Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 195. 
98 Ibid., 264. 
99 Ibid., 277. 
 42
The American decision makers’ extreme concern about secrecy also negatively 
affected the execution phase of the operation just as it did the preparation phase. 
Communication between the helicopter pilots during infiltration was not permitted. The 
airplane pilots could not pass necessary weather information to the helicopter pilots. The 
loss of helicopters might have been prevented if the airplane pilots had a chance to warn 
the helicopter pilots about the weather. 
5. Conclusion 
Rescuing 53 American hostages from thousands of miles away inside an enemy 
state is a daunting mission. Operation Eagle Claw failed but the U.S. ultimately built U.S. 
Special Operations Command based on the lessons learned from the mission. Likewise, 
as an example of a failed special operation, Operation Eagle Claw offers valuable 
information about the roles of decision makers during a special operation to test the 
hypotheses of the study. Learning from the mistakes of the American senior decision 
makers can help future decision makers to avoid the same mistakes. 
D. THE MOSCOW THEATER HOSTAGE CRISIS 
The Moscow Theater hostage crisis is a well-known incident that was solved by 
conducting a special operation. Russian Special Forces, Spetsnaz, conducted a rescue 
operation to end the siege that cost hundreds of hostages’ lives. Though a few articles 
have been written about the incident, few have examined the roles of Russian decision 
makers during the crisis. This case aims to do so.  
1. Political-Military Situation 
The Moscow hostage-taking incident occurred October 23–26, 2002. The incident 
is publicly known as “The October 2002 Moscow Hostage Taking.” Before the incident, 
the negotiations between Chechen leadership and Russian authorities were in progress. 
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The incident involved three sides: moderate Chechens, Chechen extremists, and the 
Kremlin. Each side aimed to maximize its own interests during the event.100  
Radical Chechens, whose leaders were Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udugov, had 
begun blowing up targets in Russian cities—Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgodonks—in 
1999 to terrorize the whole Russian population and to denigrate the reputation of Aslan 
Maskhadov, who had gained the support of the West and was ready to negotiate a 
solution to the Chechen conflict.101 In this respect, the radical Chechens carried out the 
hostage-taking assault to end the negotiations between moderate Chechens and the 
Russian authorities. Another goal of the Chechen extremists was to get financial support 
from the Gulf States and other Muslim countries by attacking Russians.102 
Meanwhile, moderate Chechens, led by Aslan Maskhadov, were supporting the 
negotiations with Russian authorities to solve the Chechen conflict. Therefore, they did 
not support the hostage-taking terrorist action in Dubrovka; they declared that the 
Chechen leadership headed by Maskhadov denounced hostile actions against civilians.103 
Moreover, moderate Chechens advised the hostage-takers to negotiate with the Russian 
authorities and release the hostages immediately.   
The Kremlin leadership was under the heavy political pressure within Russia and 
from the West to negotiate with the moderate Chechens headed by Aslan Maskhadov to 
solve the conflict in Chechnya. The protracted Chechen conflict was tarnishing President 
Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings. However, Russian authorities sought ways to 
legitimize the war against the Chechens in Chechnya. The biggest problem was that the 
separatist Chechen movement gained sympathy from abroad. The Russian government 
was waiting for a chance to show the rest of the world that Chechen separatists were 
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terrorists and had a relationship with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.104 The Moscow Theatre 
hostage crisis provided the opportunity that the Russian government was heartily seeking.  
2. Concept of Operation and Role of Decision Makers 
Forty Chechen terrorists attacked the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow and took 
control of the theater and the 979 people inside the building on October 23, 2002, at 
9:00 p.m.105 The terrorists had automatic weapons and hand grenades and some of them 
were wearing suicide belts. They also placed a number of bombs throughout the building. 
The leader of the terrorists stated that they were a suicide group and they came not to kill 
the hostages or fight against the Russian forces. The terrorists demanded that military 
operations in Chechnya end and those Russian federal troops withdraw.106 They simply 
wanted to end the Second Chechen War which was dominated by the Russian military 
forces and had killed thousands of Chechens.  
After receiving the initial news, President Putin called an emergency meeting with 
his advisers to discuss how to end the hostage-taking crisis in the Dubrovka Theater. At 
the same time, he sent the country’s elite counterterrorism Special Forces squad to 
the scene.107 The Russian authorities managed the negotiations using different 
individuals to buy time for planning the mission and to try to convince the terrorists to 
release the hostages. Putin made his decision to storm the building while negotiations 
were taking place.108 
During the crisis, Russian authorities made several declarations to the terrorists 
and the public. First, Russian authorities announced that there was an Arab terrorist with 
                                                 
104 Ibid., 105. 
105 Ibid., 131. 
106 “Hostage-Takers ‘Ready to Die,’” BBC, October 25, 2002, sec. Europe, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2360735.stm. 
107 Michael Wines, “Chechens Seize Moscow Theater, Taking as Many as 600 Hostages,” New York 
Times, October 24, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/24/world/chechens-seize-moscow-theater-
taking-as-many-as-600-hostages.html. 
108 “Yavlinsky Describes His Role in Crisis,” Moscow Times, November 4, 2002. 
 45
the Chechen terrorists and asserted that this fact proved Al-Qaeda’s involvement in the 
incident. Later on, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that the 
terrorists’ lives were guaranteed if they released the hostages; he made this 
announcement after having a meeting with Putin.109 In addition, the chair of the 
Federation Council addressed the terrorists and hostages via a radio program. He stated 
that if the hostage takers released the hostages, the Russian authorities would let the 
Chechens leave Russia safely. These statements were made to gain time to prepare the 
operation.   
In the meantime, Special Forces soldiers were seeking every opportunity to get 
intelligence about the building. The negotiation process provided great opportunities to 
gather tactical intelligence. Soldiers used electronic and acoustic surveillance to monitor 
movements of the terrorists.110 They placed listening devices using the sewers to get 
close to the terrorists.111 After finalizing the plan, the military authorities briefed Putin 
about the details. Putin gave to “go ahead” and the operation was ready to begin.  
3. Mission Execution and Results 
Many experts think that the hostage rescue operation itself was completed 
effectively; however, the hostages’ protection was ignored in order to preserve the 
secrecy of the operation. Before entering the building, the now famous incident occurred; 
the Russian Special Forces pumped poisonous sleeping gas into the building through the 
air-conditioning system to incapacitate the terrorists inside.112 The decision to use gas 
was made by the operation headquarters but Putin gave the final permission.  
The operation began during the early hours of the morning on October 26. Dozens of 
heavily armed and masked Spetsnaz soldiers entered the building from all sides. One 
team burst into the theater from the basement; another unit stormed through the front 
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door.113 There was shooting between special forces soldiers and the terrorists still 
conscious because they were not on the main stage of the theater. Spetsnaz soldiers killed 
all the terrorists and announced that the theater was secure less than two hours after the 
operation began.114 
At the end of the operation, most of the hostages died apparently because of the 
effects of the gas, not from terrorists’ bullets.115 Five hostages were killed by terrorists; 
the actual death toll due to poisonous gas and the lack of available medical care was 
about 130 hostages.116 Furthermore, it is understood that all bombs located in the theater 
building at Dubrovka Theater were fake and therefore incapable of detonating.117 It is not 
clear, though, whether the Russian Special Forces soldiers were aware of this fact.  
After the hostage rescue operation, President Putin invited the Russian Special 
Forces soldiers who conducted the operation to a special reception at the Kremlin in order 
to congratulate them.  
4. Assessment of the Roles of Decision Makers 
This assessment is based on this case study. Decision makers’ roles are examined 
in three phases of this special operation: approval, preparation, and execution. 
a. In the Approval Phase 
Senior Russian decision makers did not consider less risky solutions to the 
hostage-taking incident. Many experts think that the Russian authorities were unwilling 
to accept the demands of the terrorists. The crisis could have ended with fewer casualties 
by continuing the negotiations. Thus, one can conclude that Russian decision makers, 
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notably Putin, was eager to conduct the special operation and was willing to risk the lives 
of hostages in the Dubrovka Theater. 
Russian decision makers took smart steps to gain international and domestic 
support to legitimize the military rescue operation before the approval of the rescue 
operation. The announcement of an Arab terrorist’s presence among the Chechen 
terrorists was the first step; this was proof of Al-Qaeda’s alleged involvement. Thus, the 
appearance of an Arab terrorist made the incident an international terrorist attack. By 
killing the hostage takers, the Russian government would send a message to the terrorists 
and set an example of a state fighting against the international terrorist organization, Al-
Qaida. The statement was also designed to get domestic support for the operation against 
terrorists or Chechens. At that time, the Russian government was losing public support 
for the war in Chechnya. This incident would help to win public support. International 
and domestic support would affect the perception of the outcomes of the operation. 
Russian decision makers thought that the Russian people would not react too strongly, 
even if the surgical strike operation failed or if hostages lost their lives. Ultimately, these 
steps did not provide the international support that the Russian decision makers expected, 
but the domestic support for the operation and the war in Chechnya was gained 
as planned.  
Considering the outcomes of the Dubrovka hostage-taking crisis, Putin used the 
raid to send a clear message to the Chechen separatists, the Russian people, and the 
international community. He did not accede to the demands of the terrorists; he preferred 
to risk hundreds of lives. Putin might have thought that if he agreed to the demands of the 
terrorists, it would be an invitation for similar attempts all over Russia. Thus, he decided 
to take his chances to send a message to the Chechens that this kind of terrorist action 
does not deter Russian authorities. This shows that the Russian authorities were 
determined to face all possible consequences of the operation. 
b. In the Preparation Phase 
Russian decision makers selected the right unit to plan and conduct the special 
operation to rescue hostages in the Dubrovka Theater. The Spetsnaz, Russia’s SOF, was 
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the best-trained unit capable of conducting counterterrorism operations. The detailed plan 
and execution of the operation demonstrated the professionalism of the Spetsnaz units 
that conducted the hostage rescue operation except for the death of 130 civilians because 
of using contagious gas. 
Even though the Russian decision makers were criticized about unwisely 
managing the negotiations, negotiations with the terrorists bought time for the preparation 
to conduct the hostage rescue operation. Russian decision makers let several negotiators 
talk to the hostage takers. The negotiators bought time and succeeded in gaining the 
release of some hostages. The negotiation process not only saved some of the lives of the 
hostages but also provided crucially important intelligence to the planners of the 
operation.  
The Dubrovka hostage crisis, on the other hand, showed that the Russian decision 
makers ignored coordination among agencies. This is evident because there were not 
enough medical personnel outside of the theater to deal with the gassed hostages. 
Moreover, Spetsnaz soldiers, not medical crews, carried unconscious hostages onto the 
sidewalk; some of the hostages were put on buses rather than ambulances for transfer to 
hospitals.118 Additionally, the information about the type of the gas used by SOF was not 
provided to the medical personnel so that they could prepare antidotes for the 
unconscious hostages. According to Adam Dolnik and Richard Pilch, the failure of the 
military authorities to inform medical personnel about the gas beforehand and to make 
necessary coordination worsened the consequences of the hostage rescue operation.119 
c. In the Execution Phase 
The role of senior level Russian decision makers during the execution phase of 
the operation was negligible. The Spetsnaz was responsible for the execution phase of the 
rescue operation. After the operation, Putin congratulated the Spetsnaz soldiers with a 
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special reception in the Kremlin. As the most senior decision maker, he showed his 
support to the Spetsnaz forces. Putin’s behavior represents additional an additional 
important factor – support to the troops.    
5. Conclusion 
The Moscow Theatre hostage crisis is a valuable case study to examine how 
Russian decision makers behaved in a crisis situation that requires a special operation for 
a solution. In the approval phase of the operation, the presence of the Russian decision 
makers was strong. In the preparation phase, the Russian decision makers did not 
intervene in the process. By not involving, senior leaders allowed the lack of coordination 
to result in deaths that might have been avoided. In execution phase, the Russian decision 
makers provided good examples for future decision makers by not interfering. 
Consequently, examining the roles of the Russian decision makers during the crisis 















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 51
III. VALIDATING THE HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, I examine the validity of the hypotheses based on the analyses of 
four case studies. The hypotheses help answer the research question, what are the roles of 
senior level decision makers in special operations? 
A. HYPOTHESIS 1 
The first hypothesis is that the level of decision makers’ control and involvement 
should be high in the approval phase of special operations. In all four cases, senior 
decision makers’ involvement was high –as one would expect– because of two reasons: 
the great risks of the operations and possible unwanted consequences. In the approval 
phase of Operation Thunderbolt, the Israeli senior decision makers had numerous 
meetings to find less risky solutions before approving the military operation. The 
negotiations process and attempts to put international pressure on Idi Amin were the less 
risky but efforts by Israeli decision makers to solve the crisis were unsuccessful. 
Additionally, the Israeli decision makers examined thoroughly all ramifications of the 
high-risk operation. They were aware of the fact that the hostages’ safety, Israel’s future, 
and their political careers were on the line. Therefore, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
wanted Cabinet approval to execute the rescue operation.  
In the approval phase of Operation Nimrod, senior decision makers were at the 
forefront. Even though Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher preferred to delegate authority 
to the Home Secretary, she drew a framework to guide the COBRA. The COBRA served 
as a decision-making element during the crisis and led the negotiation process. All 
responses to the demands of the hostage takers came from the COBRA. The decision to 
conduct the special operation to rescue hostages was taken by COBRA under the 
leadership of Home Secretary William Whitelaw with the approval of Prime Minister 
Thatcher. 
The American decision makers were very active during the approval phase of 
Operation Eagle Claw, which was the longest among four case studies. In comparison to 
the previous two cases, President Jimmy Carter played a substantial role himself; maybe 
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the reason for this is the presidential system in the United States. During the approval 
phase, President Carter held meetings to discuss the possible solutions, and the 
consequences of these solutions. Initially, President Carter tried negotiations to free 
the hostages as a less risky solution, which was not successful. While continuing 
negotiations, he also attempted to apply international pressure and imposed economic 
sanctions to put the Iranian government in a more difficult situation. However, these 
peaceful and less risky solutions were not enough to secure the release of the U.S. 
hostages. Because of the high risk of a military operation, President Carter wanted to try 
all other less risky and peaceful options before approving a military operation. During the 
approval phase, President Carter made key decisions and sought peaceful options, which 
illustrates his high level of intervention during the approval phase of the operation.  
Similarly, the Russian decision makers’ involvement, especially that of President 
Vladimir Putin, in the approval phase of the Moscow Theater hostage taking was high. 
The negotiation process and attempts to gain international and domestic support took 
place with the approval of President Putin. He managed the situation and made the 
decision to conduct a military rescue mission. 
The case studies indicate that the high risk and potential unanticipated 
consequences of special operations necessitate high-level involvement in the approval 
phase. In all four case studies, the level of decision makers’ involvement in the approval 
phases of special operations was high and validates the first hypothesis.  
B. HYPOTHESIS 2 
The second hypothesis is that the level of decision makers’ control and 
involvement should be medium in the preparation phase of special operations. In the 
preparation phase of Operation Thunderbolt, first of all, the Israeli decision makers made 
their first appearance by choosing the right soldiers to plan and execute the operation. 
Afterward, the senior Israeli decision makers delegated this authority to the military 
decision makers. Senior military decision makers did the same thing by appointing 
General Shomron to plan and conduct the special operation. Furthermore, the Israeli 
decision makers were involved in the preparation phase only when the planners of the 
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operation needed their involvement. Examples of these situations were making the 
necessary coordination with other government agencies to provide the needs of the 
planners, continuing the negotiations to gain more time for the planners, and behaving 
appropriately to preserve the secrecy of the special operation.  
In the preparation phase of Operation Nimrod, the first role of the British decision 
makers was to choose the best-trained soldiers to plan and the conduct the operation. 
After the approval of the special operation, they were involved as the preparation phase 
necessitated. For instance, they continued the negotiation process in order to gain 
necessary time for the planners to develop a detailed plan and to rehearse the rescue 
operation. Additionally, the COBRA was always ready to take care of the coordination 
needs of the planners. Apart from these actions, the British decision makers did not 
interfere in the preparation phase of the operation.  
In comparison to Israeli and British decision makers, the Carter Administration’s 
involvement in the preparation phase of Operation Eagle Claw was slightly more than 
necessary. Their involvement in the preparation phase affected decisions on the size of 
the rescue force and the number of helicopters needed for the mission. The gratuitous 
sense of urgency instilled by the President’s Security Advisor was another example of the 
intervention of American decision makers. Furthermore, the American decision makers 
did not fulfill their roles during the preparation phase. They should have helped to 
coordinate between the planners and other governmental agencies. Additionally, military 
decision makers made a mistake by choosing U.S. Marine Corps helicopter pilots for the 
rescue mission. Their paranoia about the secrecy inhibited full rehearsals during the 
preparation phase. Considering the result of Operation Eagle Claw, it also shows that the 
decision makers should be involved in the preparation when the planners of the operation 
need their help.  
Russian decision makers’ involvement in the preparation phase of the operation, 
on the other hand, was insufficient; in other words, they did not appear to be involved 
based on the needs of the preparation phase. Russian decision makers also approved the 
continuation of the negotiation process to buy more time for planning like in previous 
case studies. However, the Russian decision makers did not fulfill their coordination role. 
 54
The lack of coordination between medical emergency providers and the rescue task force 
cost more than 100 Russian hostages’ lives. 
The case studies validate that the level of decision makers’ involvement during 
the preparation phase of special operations should be medium as the second hypothesis 
proposes. In other words, the case studies suggest that senior decision makers should 
involve themselves in the preparation phase only if the planners need their help. It is also 
clear that when senior decision makers’ involvement in the preparation phase is more 
than necessary, pressure on planners and task force personnel will be high, and that can 
negatively affect the planning efforts. Likewise, if the involvement is less than necessary, 
the planners will have a hard time getting their needs met.  
C. HYPOTHESIS 3 
The third hypothesis says that the level of decision makers’ control and 
involvement should be low in the execution phase of special operations. During the 
execution phase of the Operation Thunderbolt, for example, the presence of the senior 
Israeli decision makers was minimal. General Shomron moved with the tactical force, but 
he did not intervene. His only role was to report the updates to Tel-Aviv. The British 
decision makers also did not step into the execution phase of the Operation Nimrod. They 
only listened to the radio communications during the execution of the operation. 
Similarly, the Russian decision makers’ involvement in the execution phase of the 
operation was very minimal. 
During the Operation Eagle Claw, the American decision makers’ presence was 
minimal as well during the execution phase. When Colonel Beckwith decided to abort the 
mission, National Security Advisor Brzezinski suggested asking Beckwith to reconsider 
the decision to abort and continue the mission with five rather than six helicopters. After 
receiving the same assessment from Beckwith, Carter approved aborting the mission. The 
unhelpful suggestion that Beckwith rethink the abort decision was the only intervention 
during the execution phase of the operation. It may have been the only intervention, but it 
was a significant and dangerous one.  
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All four case studies demonstrate that the level of decision makers’ intervention in 
the execution phase of special operations should be minimal, as the third hypothesis 
advises. Their lack of tactical knowledge and their being removed from the area in which 
the special operation occurs make the presence of senior decision makers generally 
unhelpful, or even a hindrance, during the execution phase.  
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IV. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
After examining the four case studies in Chapter II, I identified several roles and 
activities of senior decision makers during the three phases of a special operation. Some 
roles and activities are common in all four cases, but some roles are derived from a single 
case. The findings of the study, which are based on the facts presented in Chapter II, 
suggest that senior decision makers should perform very specific roles for successful 
special operations.    
A. EXAMINING LESS RISKY OPTIONS 
The high-risk nature of special operations necessitates considering less risky 
options in order to solve an ongoing crisis. Senior-level decision makers should think 
carefully about other possible solutions before approving the execution of a special 
operation. A special operation failure may be devastating for a country’s future or for the 
decision makers who approved the mission. The case studies provide important examples 
to validate the examination of less risky options. For instance, Israeli decision makers 
tried every possible solution before approving Operation Thunderbolt. Likewise, British 
decision makers initially tried less risky options and waited until the last minute to be 
sure that the hostages were clearly at risk during Operation Nimrod. 
By contrast, American decision makers behaved differently during the hostage 
crisis in Iran in 1979. Initially, President Carter stated that a military option would be the 
last option. Yet, he did authorize the planning process. After six months of frustrating 
negotiations, President Carter approved the execution of the rescue operation. Even at 
that time, though, he should have continued to negotiate with the hostage takers and to 
put international pressure on the Iranian regime to minimize risk. When he approved the 
mission, the U.S. hostages were not in a life-threatening situation. The result of the failed 
mission contributed to Carter’s failure to win re-election. Failure also negatively 
impacted the SOF community and the American people. Operation Eagle Claw is a great 
illustration of the importance of seeking less risky options, especially when the hostages 
are not in danger. Similarly, in the Moscow Theater hostage incident, the Russian 
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decision makers decided hastily to conduct the special operation. The hostage takers did 
not harm any hostages before the rescue mission started. Because of the Russian decision 
makers’ eagerness to undertake the operation, hundreds of hostages were killed and 
injured during and after the rescue mission. Senior level decision makers should consider 
all less risky options before deciding to conduct a special operation in order to avoid 
unwanted consequences.   
B. GAINING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
Considering the possible undesirable results of a high-risk special operation, 
senior decision makers should attain domestic and—if possible—international support 
before authorizing a special operation. International support is crucially important in 
order to legitimize the action to the world. Furthermore, it puts more pressure on the 
target country or the terrorist organization to solve the crisis peacefully. However, 
attempts to gain international support may fail. In that case, it may compromise the 
operation, and increase the risk and likelihood of failure. On the other hand, domestic 
support is important for legitimacy. If the public is behind the operation despite its risk, 
the decision maker is on solid ground. Even if the operation fails, the population will 
understand. In addition, public support is also important for the SOF soldiers who 
conduct the operation. They know their country is behind them.  
In Operation Thunderbolt, Israeli decision makers took several steps to gain 
international support to put more pressure on Idi Amin and the hostage takers. In the 
same manner, they also sought UN intervention to solve the crisis peacefully. Israeli 
decision makers’ efforts did not solve the crisis peacefully, but contributed to legitimize 
the action to the world. Similarly, in Operation Eagle Claw, President Carter utilized the 
UN and its allies to put pressure on the new Iranian regime to solve the crisis peacefully. 
In the Moscow Theater incident, the Russian decision makers made several 
announcements that asserted the connection between the hostage takers and Al-Qaeda, to 
generate international support before the operation. All these attempts were made to gain 
international support and strengthen the decision makers’ hand before conducting the 
operations.  
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Even though these attempts could not solve the crises in the case studies, they 
helped decision makers to legitimize their actions and accept the consequences. 
Therefore, senior level decision makers should work to gain international and domestic 
support during a crisis especially when a special operation is contemplated.  
C. DELEGATING NECESSARY AUTHORITY  
Delegating authority is an important requirement for a successful special 
operation because it allows senior decision makers to get additional options from their 
subordinates. The delegation of authority is more important in the execution and 
preparation phases. If senior decision makers dominate these phases, attention will be 
diverted from proper planning and rehearsals.  
In Operation Thunderbolt, Operation Nimrod, and the Moscow Theater hostage 
rescue, the decision makers delegated the necessary authority to the military experts 
during the preparation and the execution phases of the missions. By contrast, President 
Carter and National Security Advisor Brzezinski interfered during the preparation phase 
of Operation Eagle Claw. Carter was involved with determining the size of the rescue 
force. Carter’s attitude might have forced the military planners to think that they had to 
keep the rescue task force smaller than was necessary for the operation. Likewise, 
Brzezinski’s intervention caused the gratuitous feeling of urgency among the planners in 
the Pentagon. Both behaviors did not help during the preparation phase. They were an 
unnecessary diversion. Therefore, senior decision makers also should avoid making 
things more difficult for planners and practitioners of a special operation by delegating 
decision making authority to subordinate commanders. To conduct a successful special 
operation, senior decision makers should take advantage of their subordinates’ expertise 
by delegating the necessary authority for preparation and execution.  
D. ESTABLISHING A CLEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND 
Special operations require a clear and simple chain of command and control 
structure. The role of establishing a clear chain of command helps planners and prevents 
the confusion about command and control related issues. If everyone knows who is in 
charge and who is the person to ask for help, the process will become less complex. 
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During the preparation phase of Operation Eagle Claw, Major General Vaught and the 
planners experienced the problem related to the chain of command structure. Major 
General Philip G. Gast, U.S. Air Force, who served as a special consultant, was senior to 
Vaught. The planning personnel were confused about obeying orders coming from two 
generals. The unclear chain of command delayed the execution of orders and 
coordination efforts. Along the same line, an unclear chain of command at the Desert One 
location caused serious problems for the rescue task force in the execution phase of 
Operation Eagle Claw. Pilots did not follow orders until they clearly recognized the 
commander of the ground force and other officers. Consequently, a clear and 
recognizable chain of command eases the process of preparation and execution of a 
special operation. Senior decision makers should establish a clear chain of command at 
the beginning of the crisis. If the situation requires, they also need to update the structure 
to able to conduct a successful special operation.  
E. SELECTING APPROPRIATE UNITS 
Complex and high-risk environments require specially trained and equipped units. 
Every special operation is unique. Selecting the appropriate unit in order to decrease the 
level of risk and increase the likelihood of success of a special operation is an important 
activity for senior military decision makers. In all four case studies, the decision makers 
selected their armed forces’ best units to conduct the special operations. The Unit, the 
SAS, Delta Force, and the Spetsnaz were the best-trained counterterrorism forces of their 
respective nations’ armed forces. Air force pilots in Operation Thunderbolt were the best 
pilots in the Israeli Air Force. However, the selection of marine helicopter pilots for 
Operation Eagle Claw by military decision makers was not appropriate. They were not 
trained to fly long distance at night, especially in a desert dust storm. A special operation 
task force should consist of fully trained personnel who have all the required capabilities 
for a mission. Consequently, senior decision makers should select the best units to plan 
and execute a special operation. Civilian decision makers should delegate the authority to 
select the appropriate units and personnel to leaders who know the level of training and 
the abilities of military units and the personnel in those units.  
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F. GAINING TIME 
More time means a better preparation process with a detailed plan for a special 
operation. The planners need the opportunity to examine the details of the operation 
several times before its execution, and they will also benefit from more intelligence as 
time passes. Additionally, the task force will have more chances to rehearse the mission 
to fine tune the execution. Buying time often falls on the decision maker. For instance, if 
these individuals manage the negotiations with hostage takers effectively, more time can 
be gained. The effort to gain time also aids the intelligence collection process. During the 
preparation phases of the case studies, the decision makers approved continuing 
negotiations to gain more time for planners. Therefore, one can conclude that if there is 
an opportunity to gain more time, senior decision makers should take the necessary steps 
to do so.  
G. COORDINATING 
The preparation and execution phases of a special operation demand a 
successfully functioning coordination system. Senior decision makers should facilitate a 
functioning coordination system between the planners and the other governmental 
agencies. Otherwise, the planners cannot easily obtain what they need in time to properly 
prepare for a special operation. This point is illustrated in the case studies. During 
Operation Thunderbolt, Mossad quickly responded to the intelligence needs of the 
planners because of the effective coordination system among Israeli agencies. In a similar 
manner, the COBRA successfully performed the coordination role between the planners 
and other British agencies during Operation Nimrod. Coordinating with the airport 
authorities quickly is a great illustration. But, during the Operation Eagle Claw, it is hard 
to conclude that the American decision makers fulfilled the coordination role between the 
planners and other agencies. Getting intelligence from the CIA to the planners was not 
effective. Likewise, the Russian authorities failed to coordinate with medical personnel to 
provide emergency care to wounded hostages. Hence, the cost of insufficient 
coordination has massive consequences. Senior decision makers should establish a well-
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organized coordination system between planners and other institutions and organizations 
for a successful special operation.  
H. PRESERVING SECRECY 
Secrecy is crucially important to create surprise during special operations. In 
some cases, senior decision makers can contribute to preserving the secrecy of a special 
operation. Operation Thunderbolt is a great example of preserving secrecy by senior 
decision makers. In an effort to promote an atmosphere of “business as usual,” some of 
the Israeli ministers participated in routine receptions, and General Gur went to the 
funeral of his father-in-law, which helped conceal the ongoing preparations from hostage 
takers or a suspicious public. Senior decision makers should help to preserve the secrecy 





This chapter returns to the research question and provides an argument based on 
the hypotheses that were tested with the four case studies. The research question of the 
thesis is “What is the appropriate level of control and involvement of senior level 
decision makers during the approval, preparation, and execution phases of a special 
operation?” In order to answer the research question, I identified three hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis is that the level of decision makers’ control and involvement should be 
high in the approval phase of a special operation. The second hypothesis is that the level 
of decision makers’ control and involvement should be medium in the preparation phase 
of a special operation. The third hypothesis is that the level of decision makers’ control 
and involvement should be low in the execution phase of a special operation.  
To answer the research question, the hypotheses were tested on four special 
operation rescue missions. Results of testing cautiously answer the research question. 
Then, verified roles learned from the case studies can guide senior decision makers about 
their roles while directing the process of conducting short-duration direct action type of 
special operations.  
A. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY AND THE FINDINGS  
Hypothesis 1 examines the level of decision makers’ control and involvement in 
the approval phase of a special operation. It asserts that the level of involvement should 
be high in the approval phase. In all four cases, senior decision makers’ involvement was 
high in the approval phases of the operations. In the approval phase of Operation 
Thunderbolt, the Israeli senior decision makers’ involvement was high. They had 
numerous meetings to find less risky solutions before approving the military operation. In 
Operation Nimrod, British decision makers were at the forefront during the approval 
phase of the operation. Similarly, the American decision makers were very active during 
the approval phase of Operation Eagle Claw. The Russian decision makers’ involvement, 
especially that of President Vladimir Putin, in the approval phase of the Moscow Theater 
hostage case was also high. In all four case studies, the level of decision makers’ 
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involvement in the approval phases of special operations was high as the first hypothesis 
suggests. 
Hypothesis 2 examines the level of decision makers’ control and involvement in 
the preparation phase of a special operation. It suggests that the level of involvement 
should be medium in the preparation phase, which means decision makers should be 
involved when the process requires their attention. In the preparation phase of Operation 
Thunderbolt, the Israeli decision makers were involved when their involvement was 
required. During Operation Nimrod, British decision makers’ involvement was medium 
as well. After approving the special operation, they were involved only as the preparation 
phase necessitated. In Operation Eagle Claw, in comparison to Israeli and British 
decision makers, the Carter Administration’s involvement was slightly more than 
necessary in the preparation phase. This involvement contributed to some of the negative 
impacts mentioned in Chapter II. In the Moscow hostage crisis, Russian decision makers’ 
involvement in the preparation phase of the operation was lower than necessary. Their 
lack of involvement contributed to the death of more than a hundred Russian hostages. 
Results from examining the case studies validate that the level of decision makers’ 
involvement during the preparation phase of special operations should be medium as the 
second hypothesis proposes.  
Hypothesis 3 examines the level of decision makers’ control and involvement in 
the execution phase of a special operation. It suggests that the level of involvement 
should be lower than in the approval and preparation phases. During Operation 
Thunderbolt, the involvement of the senior Israeli decision makers was minimal in the 
execution phase. They did not intervene. The British decision makers also did not step 
into the execution phase of Operation Nimrod. Similarly, in the Moscow hostage crisis, 
Russian decision makers’ involvement in the execution phase of the operation was very 
minimal. In Operation Eagle Claw, the American decision makers’ involvement was 
minimal as well. When the abort decision was made, Brzezinski’s suggestion that 
Beckwith reconsider the decision was the only intervention during the execution phase of 
the operation. All four case studies demonstrate that the level of decision makers’ 
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intervention in the execution phase of a special operation should be minimal, as the third 
hypothesis advises.  
The results of examining the case studies based on the hypotheses are shown in 
Table 1. According to the analysis, the decision makers’ level of involvement during the 
approval phase of a special operation should be high. During the preparation phase, 
senior decision makers’ involvement should be medium, which is also defined as being 
involved when the preparation process requires. Finally, senior decision makers should 
avoid interfering during the execution phase of special operations. Operation Thunderbolt 
and Operation Nimrod are two successful special operations. The decision makers 
behaved appropriately during the three phases of the special operations. In comparison, 
Operation Eagle Claw is a failed special operation in which the decision makers should 
have been more careful while directing the process. It is hard to claim that the Moscow 
Theater hostage rescue mission was successful. Even though all the terrorists were killed, 
more than a hundred hostages lost their lives during the operation and many more 
were injured. Russian decision makers’ involvement was insufficient in the preparation 
phase of the operation. The result of the operation was mixed, neither a complete success 
nor a failure.  
Table 1.   Summary of the Results of the Case Studies 
























Low Low Low Low 
Result  Success Success Failure Mixed 
 
The study of the four special operations cases identifies certain roles and activities 
of decision makers in special operations as findings of this thesis. These specifically 
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suggested roles might guide decision makers while directing the process of conducting a 
special operation. The first identified role is to examine less risky options, which should 
be accomplished in the approval phase of a special operation. Decision makers should 
consider all less risky options to end the crisis peacefully before approving a special 
operation, which is very risky. The second identified role is to gain international and 
domestic support. The decision makers should carry out this task in the approval and 
preparation phases of a special operation. It may ease the tension and solve the crisis 
peacefully. The third identified role is to delegate authority as necessary. The decision 
makers should fulfill this role in all three phases of a special operation: approval, 
preparation, and execution. It may help them take advantage of their subordinates’ skills. 
However, decision makers should be careful about delegating more authority than 
necessary otherwise they may lose control of the overall process. The fourth identified 
role is to establish a clear chain of command. The decision makers should fulfill this role 
in all three phases of a special operation. A clear chain of command helps the process 
function flawlessly. The fifth identified role is to select the appropriate units. The 
decision makers should fulfill this role in the approval and preparation phases of the 
operation. The sixth identified role is to gain time. The negotiations process not only 
seeks a possible peaceful, safe solution to a crisis, but also to gain time. The decision 
makers should perform this role in the approval and preparation phases of a special 
operation. Especially, in the preparation phase, time is crucial for the planners of the 
special operation. The seventh identified role is as coordinator. The decision makers 
should fulfill this role all three phases of a special operation. As the highest authority, the 
decision makers can easily solve the problems related to coordination. The last identified 
role is to preserve secrecy. The decision makers should fulfill this role in all three phases 
of the operation. It facilitates surprise in executing the special operation.  
The identified roles of decision makers in special operations that emerge from the 
four cases studied are summarized in Table 2. These roles do not guarantee a successful 
special operation. However, based on the case studies, ignoring the identified roles might 
increase the risk of the operation, cause undesired consequences, put more pressure on 
planners and practitioners, and prevent the conduct of a successful special operation.  
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Table 2.   Appropriate Roles of Decision Makers in Special Operations.  
Appropriate Roles of Decision 
Makers in Special Operations Approval Phase
Preparation 
Phase Execution Phase
Examining Less Risky Options +   
Gaining International and Domestic 
Support 
+ +  
Delegating Necessary Authority + + + 
Establishing a Clear Chain of 
Command 
+ + + 
Selecting Appropriate Units + +  
Gaining Time + +  
Coordination + + + 
Preserving Secrecy + + + 
 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Today, senior decision makers are facing more complex problems that require 
special operations to solve them. In this respect, Special Forces units take on more 
responsibility with each passing day because senior decision makers require Special 
Forces to resolve emerging problems. The implications of the findings can serve to guide 
senior decision makers while dealing with a crisis that requires a special operation for a 
solution. The suggested level of involvement and the roles that decision makers should 
perform during the approval, preparation, and execution phases of a special operation can 
guide senior decision makers in the progress.  
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has examined the level of decision maker involvement in three phases 
of a special operation in four well-known case studies. Considering the many special 
operations conducted before and after these four cases, the first area of further research 
might be to test the hypotheses in additional types of special operations, performed by 
different SOF units. The process of conducting a special operation changes depending on 
the type of the special operation. The roles of senior decision makers might be different 
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for protracted special operations. Therefore, examining more cases can provide additional 
evidence about the appropriate level of senior decision makers’ intervention in different 
types of special operations.  
The second area for future research involves testing the identified roles of 
decision makers in different cases. Some of the roles are derived from only one case; 
some of them are common in four cases. Thus, testing these roles for decision makers in 
additional cases can add valuable information to validate their roles. 
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